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Introduction 
 
A growing body of literature argues that democracies are more likely to comply with 
international agreements than authoritarian states (e.g. Gaubatz, 1996; Mansfield, 
Milner and Rosendorff, 2002; Smith, 1996). Such arguments often point to the 
potential deterrent effect of democratic elections. Voters are believed to punish 
leaders who violate international agreements by voting against them in the next 
election. This makes it costly for democratically elected leaders to breach 
international agreements; doing so reduces their chance of staying in office 
(McGillivray and Smith, 2000). Electorally minded leaders in democratic states 
therefore comply with international agreements to maximize their chances of re-
election, according to conventional wisdom. The implication is that democratic states 
violate international agreements less frequently than authoritarian states.  
However, significant variation in compliance behaviour exists amongst 
democracies. While some consistently comply with international agreements, others 
habitually violate them. In fact, the most frequent violators of agreements negotiated 
within the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO) are high-functioning 
democracies with strong, credible opposition parties and regular competitive 
elections. This poses a puzzle for existing theories of democratic compliance, 
particularly those that place primary importance on the deterrent effects of 
competitive elections. If elections deter non-compliance, as conventional wisdom 
suggests, why do some democratically elected leaders violate international 
agreements more often than others?  
Significant and important variation in electoral competition exists amongst 
democratic states. This variation results from the different ways in which democratic 
leaders are elected and helps to explain why some democracies violate international 
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agreements more often than others. In majoritarian systems, politicians need 50 
percent plus one of the votes in their electoral district to win (re)election and parties 
need to win a majority of the districts to win control of the legislature. This engenders 
candidate-centred competition in which narrow interests have substantial political 
influence (e.g. Carey and Shugart, 1995; Persson & Tabellini, 2003). In contrast, 
proportional electoral rules (PR) engender party-centred competition. In these 
systems, parties work to maximize their share of the national vote and therefore 
respond to relatively broad interests.  
Compliance with international agreements often benefits broad segments of 
the country’s population; frequently at the expense of narrow groups. Virtually all 
international agreements have distributive consequences that make some voters better 
off and others worse off (Tomz, 2002). For example, the World Trade Organization’s 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures makes consumers better off by 
restricting the use of subsidies. Subsidies targeted to individual industries or firms are 
explicitly banned by Articles 1 through 9.i These international restrictions increase 
economic efficiency and reduce costs to consumers. Consumers, a large segment of 
most countries’ populations, benefit from compliance with these international 
agreements. However, narrow segments of the population, such as domestic 
producers, are arguably made worse off by compliance with this agreement. Narrow 
producer groups, such as individual firms and industries, can no longer earn rents via 
lucrative government subsidies. Given this, domestic producers tend to favour non-
compliance with this international agreement because violations serve their own self-
interest.  
This is an important point – one that has been largely overlooked in existing 
studies of international compliance. If voters’ preferences for compliance are not 
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uniform, then the effect of democratic elections on compliance is ambiguous. It will 
depend critically on the electoral incentives facing politicians and the pattern of voter 
support for compliance. If, for example, compliance benefits broad-based groups such 
as consumers, then politicians in proportional rule countries have greater electoral 
incentives to comply with the agreement. This is because the best electoral strategy 
for politicians and parties in proportional rule systems is to appeal to broad segments 
of the population to maximize the party’s vote share (e.g. Carey and Shugart, 1995; 
Persson & Tabellini, 2003). Vote share determines the number of seats a party will 
control in the country’s legislature. By maximizing its vote share, a party maximizes 
its power in the legislature and its chances of being in government. This implies that 
amongst democracies, those with proportional electoral rules are relatively more 
likely to comply with international agreements that benefit the greater good (i.e. broad 
segments of a country’s population), such as the GATT/WTO restrictions on narrow 
transfers. 
In contrast, democracies with plurality (or majoritarian) electoral rules are 
relatively more likely to violate GATT/WTO restrictions on narrow transfers. By 
providing narrow transfers, politicians can target benefits to constituents in their 
geographically-defined district thereby increasing their chances of re-election (e.g. 
Persson & Tabellini, 2003). Parties competing in two-party majoritarian systems can 
use narrow transfers to target benefits to key electoral districts. To win control of the 
legislature, a party competing in a two-party majoritarian system needs to win a 
majority of the seats (electoral districts). To achieve this, parties use narrow transfers 
to target benefits to those districts where they are likely to have the greatest impact on 
the party’s electoral success.ii In this way, the provision of narrow transfers 
maximizes the chances of electoral success for parties and politicians competing in 
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majoritarian systems. The implication is that democracies with majoritarian electoral 
rules are more likely to violate GATT/WTO restrictions on narrow transfers, as 
compared to proportional rule democracies, because narrow transfers provide unique 
electoral benefits in majoritarian systems.  
Instances of non-compliance with GATT/WTO restrictions on narrow 
transfers amongst democratic member countries from 1980 to 2003 are analyzed here 
to assess the empirical validity of this argument. Consistent with expectations, 
majoritarian democracies are found to be more likely to violate GATT/WTO 
restrictions on narrow transfers, as compared to proportional rule democracies, 
holding all else equal. This finding is robust to the inclusion of numerous control 
variables and model specifications.  
The main theoretical implication of this research is that the effect of 
democracy on compliance with international agreements is conditional rather than 
direct. The consequences of democratic accountability depend critically on a 
country’s electoral institutions and voters’ interests. Democracy makes compliance 
more likely when a state’s electoral institutions privilege those voters that prefer 
compliance. In contrast, democracy makes compliance less likely when the electoral 
institutions advantage voters that favour non-compliance. This provides a possible 
explanation for the observed but previously unexplained variance in compliance 
amongst democratic states. Interestingly, the same mechanism that links regime type 
to compliance, namely electoral competition, also explains variation in compliance 
amongst democracies.   
This has important theoretical implications for some of the key debates in 
International Relations including, for example, the degree to which the causes of 
international political and economic trends are to be found at the domestic or 
 6 
international level (Frieden and Lake, 2000). While some International Relations 
scholars rule out explanations of international phenomena by reference to internal 
characteristics of the nation-state (e.g. Waltz, 1979), others argue that national 
concerns can override global considerations. This research supports the latter view. A 
democratic state’s compliance with international agreements depends critically on two 
key internal characteristics: electoral institutions and voters’ preferences over 
compliance. The implication is that both the state (i.e. political institutions) and 
society play a significant role in countries’ foreign economic policies and their 
compliance with international agreements.  
The reminder of the paper is organized in six parts. Section 2 briefly discusses 
the GATT/WTO restrictions on narrowly targeted transfers. Sector 3 lays out the 
theoretical argument as to why some democracies violate international agreements 
more often than others. Section 4 describes the empirical tests of the theoretical 
expectations derived in the previous section. The results of the empirical tests are 
discussed in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes the paper.  
Context 
Restrictions on narrow transfers have long been the focus of multilateral 
negotiations because they are believed to cause significant economic distortions. As 
early as the Tokyo Round of 1979, narrowly targeted subsidies were regulated by 
GATT Articles VI, XVI and XXIII.iii Since then, restrictions on narrow transfers have 
been strengthened and expanded. The WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (Articles 1 through 9) explicitly bans government subsidies 
targeted exclusively to individual industries or firms. Furthermore, the use of 
narrowly targeted transfers is implicitly restricted by other GATT/WTO rules that 
require general reductions in trade barriers and open market access. Under 
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GATT/WTO rules, member country governments are expected to refrain from 
privileging domestic producers via narrowly targeted transfers and/or trade barriers. 
Countries that choose to provide narrowly targeted transfers in violation of 
GATT/WTO rules risk being filed against at the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body. 
This entails potentially significant costs including international sanctions, the costs of 
participating in a GATT/WTO dispute, reputation costs, and the costs of 
compensating a plaintiff if ruled against by a Panel. Despite these costs, some 
governments choose to provide illegal narrow transfers in violation of GATT/WTO 
rules. For example, the United States government imposed 30 percent tariffs on steel 
imports in March 2002. Within a few days, the European Union (EU) lodged a formal 
complaint with the World Trade Organization (WTO) alleging that such tariffs were 
illegal. In November 2003, the WTO ruled that the American tariffs were illegal and 
subsequently China, the European Union and Japan announced their intent to levy 
costly retaliatory sanctions against the United States (Mahncke, 2004). 
Why would a democratically elected government choose to violate 
GATT/WTO rules and risk costly international sanctions? Existing compliance 
theories generally argue that they would not. Democratic governments are commonly 
believed to comply with international agreements. Two key arguments suggest why 
this may be the case. The first argues that democracies comply with international legal 
obligations because democratic regimes share an affinity with prevalent international 
legal processes and institutions (e.g. Dixon, 1993; Slaughter, 1995). The logic is that 
because democratic regimes respect the rule of law and domestic constitutional 
constraints on power, they tend to accept international rule-based constraints. The 
second argument suggests that democracies comply with international agreements 
because failure to do so entails costs for democratically elected leaders (e.g. Leeds, 
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1999; McGillivray and Smith, 2000). This argument rests on the assumption that 
voters value compliance and therefore will punish leaders that violate international 
agreements at the ballot box.iv In an attempt to maximize their chances of re-election, 
democratically elected leaders choose not to violate international agreements. How 
then can the United States’ decision on steel tariffs be explained and the variation in 
compliance behaviour amongst democratic states more generally?  
Theory 
Democratically elected governments violate international agreements when the 
electoral benefits of doing so outweigh the domestic and international costs. The 
domestic costs of providing an illegal narrow transfer include the actual budgetary 
costs of the transfer, the opportunity costs of funding the transfer rather than some 
other policy, and the potential economic distortions caused by the transfer. 
Additionally, voters that favour compliance may vote against leaders that violate 
international agreements in the next election thereby imposing ‘domestic audience 
costs’ (Fearon, 1994).  
The international costs of non-compliance include reputation costs and the 
potential costs of international sanctions. For example, extra duties (i.e. countervailing 
duties) can be imposed against illegally subsidized products. Such duties decrease the 
competitiveness of exports from defendant countries. Additionally, participation in the 
dispute settlement process entails resource costs, such as the financial, institutional, 
and human capital costs of litigating a dispute (Guzman and Simmons, 2005). 
Additionally, governments must consider the potential costs of compensating the 
plaintiff if ruled against by a GATT/WTO Panel. 
Governments implement WTO-inconsistent policies when the electoral 
benefits of doing so are significant (i.e. when they outweigh the costs). This is 
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evidenced by the United States’ steel tariffs. During the course of the US presidential 
election campaign in 2000, George W. Bush promised to help the steel industry in 
Ohio and West Virginia in an attempt to win votes in these key states. With the 
November 2002 midterm elections for the House of Representatives finely balanced, 
the Republicans needed to win the key steel-producing states of Ohio and 
Pennsylvania (Read, 2005: 135). The US tariffs on steel imports can therefore be seen 
as an attempt to win necessary electoral support in key states (Read, 2005). The 
electoral benefits to the Republican party of providing this illegal narrow protection 
appear to have outweighed the domestic and international costs of violating 
GATT/WTO rules.   
This illustrative example makes two important points. First, voters do not 
always punish leaders for non-compliance. Instead, some voters will reward leaders 
for violating an international agreement, like, for example, those voters in the key 
steel-producing states of Ohio and Pennsylvania. This point challenges a fundamental 
assumption in the domestic audience cost literature, namely that all voters value 
compliance and therefore punish leaders who violate international agreements. When 
voters’ preferences over compliance vary, then the expected effect of democratic 
elections on compliance is conditional rather than direct. It depends on voters’ 
interests and the country’s electoral institutions.   
Second, democratically elected governments provide illegal narrow transfers 
when the electoral benefits of doing so are substantial (i.e. when they outweigh the 
domestic and international costs). The electoral benefits of providing an illegal narrow 
transfer are most likely to outweigh the costs when politicians compete for 
(re)election under majoritarian electoral rules in single-member districts. This is 
because of the unique nature of electoral competition in countries with these electoral 
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institutions, as demonstrated formally by theoretical models of electoral competition 
(e.g. Lizzeri and Persico, 2001; Milesi-Ferreti et al., 2001; Persson and Tabellini, 
1999, 2000, 2003).  
In such models, politicians and parties are assumed to be office-seeking. They 
want to maximize their chances of re-election and to this end work to provide benefits 
to those voters most critical to their re-election chances. The identity of these voters is 
determined by the country’s electoral rules. In majoritarian systems, the most 
important voters for a politician’s re-election chances are those in the politician’s 
geographically-defined electoral district. Politicians need 50 percent plus one of the 
votes in their electoral district to win (re)election in majoritarian systems. The optimal 
strategy to secure this outcome is to provide narrowly targeted benefits to voters, 
firms, and industries located in the politician’s district (e.g. Lizzeri and Persico, 2001; 
Milesi-Ferreti et al., 2001; Persson and Tabellini, 1999, 2000, 2003). This incentive 
also exists for parties competing in two-party plurality rule systems with single-
member districts. In these systems, parties win control of the legislature (and 
executive) district by district. They therefore have incentives to target narrow 
transfers to voters in key electoral districts to maximize their chances of winning 
legislative (and executive) control. 
In short, narrowly targeted transfers provide important electoral benefits to 
politicians and parties competing in majoritarian systems. This is because politicians 
and parties use narrow transfers to target benefits to precisely those voters whose 
support they need to win re-election. This has been suggested as a possible 
explanation for the apparent protectionist bias in majoritarian countries (e.g. 
Grossman and Helpman 2005; Willmann 2004). 
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Plurality electoral rules tend to be closely associated with single-member 
electoral districts. This empirical regularity provides further incentives for electorally 
minded politicians and parties to provide narrow transfers. Single member districts 
tend to be smaller than multimember districts (Powell and Vanberg, 2000). This 
increases the influence of narrow, particularistic groups over elected representatives 
(e.g. Alt and Gilligan, 1994; Magee et al., 1989; Mansfield and Busch, 1995; 
McGillivray, 2004; Rogowski, 1997).  McGillivray (2004: 28) provides the following 
illustrative example: An industry with 100 employees represents 10 percent of the 
electorate in a district with 1,000 voters. The same industry represents only 0.1 
percent of the electorate in a district of 100,000 voters. In the larger district, refusing 
to protect the industry is unlikely to affect the politician’s re-election chances because 
the industry is only 0.1 percent of the representative’s electorate. In a district of 
100,000 voters, political representatives are forced to balance the interests of a greater 
variety of industry groups. Given this, politicians elected via smaller districts have 
greater incentives to provide narrowly targeted transfers to their constituents.v  
District size has also been suggested as a possible explanation for the apparent 
protectionist bias in majoritarian countries. For example, Magee, Brock and Young 
(1989) argue that larger electoral districts minimize the electoral incentives to provide 
trade protection.vi Although the argument made here might be seen as a simple 
extension of existing arguments in the trade protection literature, a key question 
remains as to whether majoritarian democracies will provide WTO-inconsistent 
protections and transfers. Governments can (and do) provide protection in ways that 
do not violate GATT/WTO rules. For example, many countries’ tariffs are set well 
below the GATT/WTO limit. Governments interested in providing additional 
protection can do so by raising tariffs up to the agreed upon limit. Only by raising 
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tariffs above this margin do countries violate internationally agreed rules. Why would 
countries choose to provide illegal protection in violation of international agreements? 
This question is fundamentally distinct from the general question of why countries 
provide protection. The argument made here suggests that governments choose to 
provide illegal narrow transfers in violation of international agreements when the 
domestic electoral benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. This is more likely to 
occur in plurality rule democracies where narrow transfers provide unique and 
important electoral benefits to politicians facing competitive elections.  
In proportional systems, politicians and parties have fewer electoral incentives 
to supply narrowly targeted transfers, even in the absence of international restrictions 
(e.g. Lizzeri and Persico, 2001; Persson and Tabellini, 2003; Rogowski, 1987, 1997). 
Parties competing under proportional electoral rules do not win elections district by 
district. In fact, no single district is critical to the electoral success of a party 
(McGillivray, 2004). Instead, parties work to maximize their aggregate vote share 
because this determines the number of legislative seats the party will control.vii By 
targeting transfers to broad segments of the electorate, such as the elderly or 
unemployed, parties are able to “buy” the electoral support of a wide range of voters 
dispersed across electoral districts. This is precisely the type of electoral support that 
is most beneficial to parties competing in multi-member districts under proportional 
rule. Because narrowly targeted transfers provide relatively fewer electoral benefits to 
politicians competing in proportional rule systems, PR democracies are less likely to 
violate GATT/WTO rules on targeted transfers than plurality rule democracies, 
holding all else equal. The following section describes the empirical tests of this 
theoretical expectation. 
Data and methods 
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Compliance with standing, substantive rules embodied in international agreements is 
difficult to measure. Using instances of non-compliance rather than compliance is a 
straightforward way to overcome this difficulty.viii Here, complaints filed with the 
GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Body over illegal narrow transfers are used to 
measure instances of non-compliance.ix More precisely, the dependent variable is the 
cumulative number of complaints filed against a democratic GATT/WTO member 
country over illegal narrow transfers in a given year (Complaints).  
A vast majority of GATT/WTO complaints are filed in response to an illegal 
narrow transfer in the defendant country.x This is evidenced by the fact that the 
majority of all cases decided by a GATT/WTO Panel yield a victory for the 
complainant country (Guzman and Simmons, 2005). Both developed and developing 
country complainants win approximately 90% of WTO cases (Guzman and Simmons, 
2005). This suggests that the variable Complaints is a valid measure of non-
compliance. In an attempt to further increase the validity of this measure, 
GATT/WTO complaints that are explicitly political in nature and clearly do not have 
at issue an illegal narrow protection are systematically excluded from the sample. For 
example, the 1985 complaint filed by Nicaragua against the US in response to the 
trade embargo imposed by the Reagan Administration is excluded. Excluding these 
types of complaints increases the validity of this measure. Additional coding criteria 
and sample restrictions are discussed in the appendix.  
Despite these restrictive coding criteria, it is possible that some of the 
complaints included in the sample were not filed in response to illegal narrow 
protection. These cases, if they exist, are ‘false positives’ (i.e. a complaint is observed 
where no violation exists). This type of error makes it relatively more difficult to find 
evidence in support of the argument made here.  
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Complaints likely underestimates the frequency of non-compliant behaviour; 
not all instances of non-compliance engender a formal complaint. Filing a complaint 
entails costs for the plaintiff country and as a result countries file complaints only in 
select cases. A vast literature examines when and under what circumstances countries 
chose to file a GATT/WTO complaint. For example, Davis and Shirato (2007) argue 
that the characteristics of the affected export industry in the complainant country 
determine when WTO complaints are filed. Davis and Bermeo (2007) show that the 
complainant country’s domestic institutions and litigation experience play a critical 
role in the country’s decision to file a WTO dispute. Bown (2005) shows that export 
stakes and retaliatory capacity account for much of the cross-national variation in 
dispute initiation.  
These studies and others suggest that the decision to file a complaint is not 
random. Although the decision is not random, it is unlikely to be influenced by a 
defendant country’s electoral rules. Plaintiff countries are no more likely to file 
against a majoritarian country with an illegal protection than a proportional country 
with an illegal protection.xi This is an important point. It suggests that any systematic 
relationship found between a country’s electoral rules and the number of complaints 
filed against it is not the result of selection bias.  
Given the discrete and non-negative properties of the dependent variable, it is 
appropriate to use an event count procedure to model the process underlying non-
compliance with GATT/WTO restrictions on narrow transfers. The negative 
binominal model is used here because the count variable is overdispersed.xii The 
negative binomial model allows for this overdispersion and includes parameters for 
unobserved variance in the number of disputes across countries (King, 1989; Long, 
1997).  
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One might argue that the zero inflated negative binomial model may be more 
appropriate for this analysis given that the modal number of disputes in any given 
country in any given year is zero. However, the large number of zeros in the count 
variable may be the result of unobserved heterogeneity (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998; 
Long, 1997). Unobserved heterogeneity can cause both overdispersion and an 
increase in the proportion of zeros. The negative binominal model can account for the 
ovedispersion and the excess zeros in the raw data. The negative binominal model 
responds to the under prediction of zeros in the Poisson regression model by 
increasing the conditional variance without changing the conditional mean (Long, 
1997). In contrast, zero modified count models change the mean structure to explicitly 
model the production of zero counts. This is done by assuming that zeros can be 
generated by a different process than positive counts. However, the theory advanced 
here does not suggest that the zeros are generated by a different process. Given this, it 
is difficult to justify theoretically the use of the zero inflated negative binomial model. 
Estimating a zero-inflated negative binominal model does not produce dramatically 
different results.xiii In fact, no significant bias appears to be introduced by estimating 
the more theoretically sound negative binominal model rather than the zero-inflated 
model. 
The sample is an unbalanced panel of democratic GATT/WTO member-
countries with yearly observations from 1980 to 2003. These data are used in a pooled 
time-series cross-section analysis with country-years as observations. This is because 
the causal mechanism specified in the theoretical argument makes monadic 
predictions. Governments in countries with majoritarian electoral rules and/or single-
member districts are more likely to implement WTO-inconsistent policies because 
they have more to gain from doing so than governments in PR countries. As a result, 
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majoritarian democracies are more likely to be named as defendants in GATT/WTO 
complaints than proportional rule democracies. The most appropriate unit of analysis 
for testing the empirical validity of this hypothesis is monadic country-years.xiv  
The WTO replaced GATT as the organization overseeing the multilateral 
trading system during the sample period (1995). Given this, a dummy variable coded 
one for years during the WTO regime and zero otherwise is included in all estimated 
models.xv The base model also includes several addition control variables.xvi Countries 
with majoritarian electoral rules tend to have relatively larger economies, on average. 
If a defendant’s market size influences a plaintiff’s decisions to file a formal 
complaint, as suggested by Gruzman and Simmons (2005), then a spurious correlation 
between majoritarian rules and complaints may exist. To minimize concerns of a 
spurious correlation, defendant’s market size measured by the country’s GDP is 
included as a control variable in all estimated models.xvii  
Plaintiff, a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the country filed a complaint with 
the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Body in the previous year and 0 otherwise, is 
included to account for the possibility that some complaints are filed in retaliation for 
previous complaints (Busch and Reinhardt, 2002).  
Exports, calculated as the amount of goods and services exported as a percent 
of GDP, is also included. International scrutiny of a country’s compliance with 
multilateral trade agreements likely increases as a country’s exports grows. xviii  
GDP per capita is included to account for the fact that developed countries 
have historically used the GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedures more often than 
developing countries.  
The yearly rate of economic growth (Economic growth) is included to account 
for the possibility that politicians in countries experiencing low or negative growth 
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rates may face greater pressure to violate GATT/WTO rules. Furthermore, violating 
international restrictions during times of adverse economic conditions may not entail 
the same reputation costs as doing so under normal economic conditions would 
(Drazen, 1997).  
Although these control variables are not unrelated, standard tests show 
acceptable levels of multicolinearity.xix Their inclusion in a single model does not 
introduce undue bias. The results of the estimated models are reported in Table 1 and 
discussed in the following section.  
Results 
Amongst democratic countries, electoral institutions are robust predictors of non-
compliance with GATT/WTO agreements, as reported in Table 1.xx In other words, 
the variation in compliance amongst democracies can be explained, in part, by 
electoral institutions.  In Models 1 through 4, a country’s electoral rule is measured 
using a simple dummy variable coded one if a majority or all of the seats in the lower 
(or only) legislative chamber are elected via plurality electoral rules and 0 
otherwise.xxi  Given this coding rule, Germany is coded as being proportional. 
Although Germany has a mixed-member system, the total number of legislative seats 
received by a party is proportional to its list-tier results (Thames and Edwards, 2006). 
Thus the overall effect of the German system is proportionality (McGillivray, 2004). 
Like Germany, Italy has a mixed-member electoral system. Unlike the German 
system, the Italian list and nominal tiers both allocate seats independently. There is no 
attempt made to maintain proportionally between seats and votes in Italy’s system 
(Thames and Edwards, 2006). Given this, Italy is coded as being majoritarian after the 
1993 electoral reforms. The effect of a country’s mean district magnitude is estimated 
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in Models 5 through 8.xxii Given the close correspondence between electoral rules and 
district magnitude, the two variables are not included together in the same model.  
[Table 1 about here] 
Amongst high functioning democracies,xxiii majoritarian electoral rules 
significantly increase the probability of violating GATT/WTO restrictions on narrow 
transfers. Moving from a PR system to a majoritarian system increases the likelihood 
of non-compliance by nearly 7 percentage points in a single year. This effect is 
estimated using simulations via Clarify Software (King et al., 2000; Tomz et al., 
2001).xxiv On average, the expected number of violations in majoritarian democracies 
is 300 percent higher than in proportional rule (PR) democracies. 
Democratic countries with single-member districts are also more likely to 
violate GATT/WTO rules regarding the provision of narrow transfers. Moving from 
an average sized multi-member district (i.e. one with 7 seats) to a single-member 
district system increases the probability of non-compliance by more than 6 percentage 
points in a single year. On average, the expected number of disputes in democratic 
countries with single-member districts is 186 percent higher than in multi-member 
districts.  
When the sample is expanded to include a broader sample of democratic 
countries,xxv majoritarian electoral rules remain a robust predictor of non-compliance, 
as reported in Models 3 and 4. Their estimated effect is slightly lower, however. 
Changing from a PR system to a majoritarian system increases the likelihood of non-
compliance in a given year by nearly 4 percentage points. Mean district magnitude 
remains negatively related to non-compliance but no longer reaches conventional 
levels of statistical significance in the larger sample.  
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Given the frequency with which the Unites States has been involved in 
GATT/WTO disputes, readers might be concerned that the results reported here are 
driven by the inclusion of the United States in the sample. However, this does not 
appear to be the case. When the United States is excluded from the sample, as in 
Model 2 Table 1, the estimated effect of Majoritarian actually increases slightly and 
remains statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Mean District Magnitude also 
remains statistically significant but its effect is slightly smaller, as reported in Model 6 
Table 1.   
Electoral institutions remain robust to a number of additional specifications.xxvi 
Both Majoritarian and Mean District Magnitude remain statistically significant when 
country size is measured using population rather than GDP. Additionally, alternative 
lag structures matter little for the estimated coefficients for Majoritarian and Mean 
District Magnitude. This is perhaps unsurprising given that these two variables 
change only very rarely over time.  
Several other interesting findings deserve mention here. The WTO indicator 
variable is positive and significant in 4 of the 8 models, namely those estimated using 
the larger sample. This finding is consistent with previous studies that point to an 
increase in the number of cases filed under the WTO regime (e.g. Petersmann, 1997). 
Country size and income are also statistically significant in the more inclusive 
sample of democracies. Larger countries and those with higher per capita income are 
relatively more likely to violate GATT/WTO rules, all else equal. This may be 
because larger, richer countries are less sensitive to the international costs of non-
compliance and therefore violate GATT/WTO rules more frequently. Alternatively, it 
may be that countries are more likely to file against big, rich defendants because there 
are relatively greater benefits to be gained from these cases (Gruzman and Simmons, 
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2005). This points to the importance of controlling for country size when estimating 
the expected effect of electoral rules on non-compliant behaviour. If large countries 
are more likely to be filed against and they are more likely to have majoritarian 
electoral rules, it may be possible to find a spurious correlation between electoral 
rules and complaints. However, by including measures of country size in all estimated 
models, the possibility of finding a spurious correlation is minimized.xxvii 
Conclusion 
Conventional wisdom suggests that democracies are more likely to comply with 
international agreements than autocracies. However, substantial variation in 
compliance behaviour exists amongst democracies. To date, the variation amongst 
democracies has gone largely unexplained. In a world where democracy is spreading, 
it is especially important to understand democratic states’ compliance with 
international agreements.  
The pattern of compliance amongst democracies can be explained by voters’ 
interests and countries’ electoral institutions. Countries with majoritarian institutions 
violate GATT/WTO restrictions on the use of narrowly targeted transfers, such as 
industry-specific subsidies, more frequently than countries with proportional electoral 
systems. This is because majoritarian electoral rules provide incentives for politicians 
to supply transfers to narrow, select segments of the electorate. This incentive derives 
from the winner-takes-all characteristics of majoritarian electoral rules and the nature 
of electoral competition in single-member districts. In contrast, proportional electoral 
rules and multi-member districts generate incentives for politicians and parties to 
target benefits to broader segments of the electorate. As a result, governments elected 
via proportional rules are less likely to violate GATT/WTO restrictions on narrowly 
targeted transfers.  
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Although this research focuses on compliance with a particular international 
economic agreement, namely GATT/WTO restrictions on narrow transfers, the 
theoretical implications of this research are relevant for all international agreements 
that engender varied levels of voter support for compliance. When voters have 
heterogeneous preferences over compliance with an international agreement, the 
affect of democracy on states’ compliance is ambiguous. Consider, for example, many 
of the international environmental agreements. They arguably generate benefits for all 
citizens. However, they also entail substantial costs for some. For example, producers 
using environmentally unfriendly technologies find international environmental 
agreements costly. The theory advanced in this paper suggests that when such groups 
are critical to leaders’ electoral success, governments will be less concerned with (and 
committed to) compliance. Instead, governments may allow violations of the 
agreement, sanction violations of the agreement or even refuse to sign the agreement 
in the first place in an attempt to garner the critical electoral support of the ‘non-
compliance voters’. This may explain, for example, the United States’ refusal to agree 
to the Kyoto Protocol.  
Because virtually all international agreements have distributive consequences, 
some voters will prefer non-compliance. Democracy may therefore make compliance 
less likely. The effect of democracy on compliance will depend critically on the 
political importance of voters that favour non-compliance. When a state’s democratic 
institutions privilege ‘non-compliance voters’, violations of international agreements 
will be more likely. In contrast, when electoral institutions privilege those voters that 
favour compliance, democracy will make compliance more likely. In sum, the effect 
of democracy on compliance is conditional on a country’s electoral institutions and 
the interests of voters.  
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This provides a potential explanation for the mixed empirical evidence found 
to date on the effect of regime type on compliance. While some studies show that 
democracies honour their international commitments more regularly than 
authoritarian states (e.g. Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff 2002), others find either a 
negative or a negligible correlation between democracy and compliance. For example, 
Remmer (1998) finds little evidence of a positive relationship between democracy and 
commercial cooperation. Simmons (2000) finds that amongst those countries that 
joined the International Monetary Fund before 1980, democracies showed a greater 
tendency to violate international commitments. The theory advanced in this paper 
suggests a possible explanation for these mixed findings and an important avenue for 
future research. To better understand the effect of regime type on compliance with 
international agreements, we must develop and test theories about who prefers non-
compliance and when and under what circumstances they are likely to be electorally 
decisive. This research takes an important first step in this direction. 
This research makes two additional contributions. First, it demonstrates that 
WTO-inconsistent policies are neither random nor uniform across states, as is often 
assumed in studies of GATT/WTO disputes. In many such studies, the supply of 
potential cases (i.e. WTO-inconsistent policies) is taken as exogenous (e.g. Davis and 
Shirato 2007).xxviii However, this research suggests that to fully understand the pattern 
of GATT/WTO disputes, one must account for the likelihood of a WTO-inconsistent 
policy in the defendant state, which is strongly influenced by a country’s electoral 
institutions and voters’ economic interests.  
Second, this research confirms the increasingly common claim that 
majoritarian democracies are relatively more protectionist that proportional rule 
democracies (e.g. Evans, 2009; Grossman and Helpman, 2005). The novel result 
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reported here is that governments in majoritarian systems are willing to protect 
domestic producers even when doing so violates their international obligations. The 
theoretical implication is that national electoral concerns can override international 
considerations. This speaks to the ongoing debate in International Relations as to the 
degree to which the causes of international political and economic trends are to be 
found at the domestic or international level. This research points to the importance of 
domestic politics for compliance with international agreements, conventions, and 
treaties that entail distributive costs. Despite the dramatic increase in international 
interdependence and the proliferation of international agreements, it appears that the 
nation-state remains a powerful and independent actor whose internal structures shape 
foreign economic policy and international relations. Kindleberger’s (1969) 
pronouncement that ‘the nation-state is just about through as an economic unit’ 
appears to have been premature. 
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Table 1: Negative binominal model of non-compliance with GATT/WTO  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 Complaints Complaints Complaints Complaints Complaints Complaints Complaints Complaints 
         
L.Majoritarian 1.425*** 1.578*** 0.585* 0.598*     
 (0.46) (0.46) (0.32) (0.32)     
L.Mean District Magnitude (log)     -0.527*** -0.508*** -0.203 -0.188 
     (0.17) (0.18) (0.13) (0.13) 
L.Plaintiff 0.410 0.384 0.358 0.380 0.410 0.542 0.397 0.462 
 (0.33) (0.38) (0.29) (0.34) (0.34) (0.37) (0.29) (0.33) 
WTO Regime 0.245 0.152 0.793*** 0.850** 0.360 0.198 0.775*** 0.789** 
 (0.32) (0.39) (0.29) (0.35) (0.32) (0.38) (0.29) (0.35) 
L.Exports (log) -0.373 -0.00666 -0.895** -0.733** -0.597 -0.331 -0.881** -0.716* 
 (0.46) (0.47) (0.37) (0.36) (0.48) (0.47) (0.38) (0.37) 
L.Economic Growth (log) 0.184 0.0654 0.207 0.152 0.0608 0.0342 0.157 0.128 
 (0.29) (0.32) (0.24) (0.28) (0.29) (0.32) (0.24) (0.28) 
L.GDP (log) 0.486*** 0.453*** 0.429*** 0.435*** 0.452*** 0.528*** 0.450*** 0.490*** 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.100) (0.10) (0.13) (0.16) (0.12) (0.13) 
L.GDP Per Captia (log) 0.457* 0.272 0.440*** 0.355* 0.491** 0.420 0.468*** 0.402* 
 (0.25) (0.28) (0.16) (0.19) (0.23) (0.28) (0.17) (0.21) 
Constant -20.14*** -18.57*** -16.39*** -16.24*** -17.25*** -19.40*** -16.62*** -17.60*** 
 (5.23) (5.36) (3.00) (3.29) (4.68) (5.59) (3.39) (3.74) 
         
Observations 571 556 748 733 557 542 713 698 
# of Countries 40 39 54 53 40 39 53 52 
Alpha (log) -1.631 -1.028 -1.330 -0.293 -2.099 -0.852 -1.562 -0.329 
 (1.67) (1.80) (1.33) (0.92) (2.34) (1.61) (1.55) (0.95) 
Mcfadden's Pseudo R-squared  0.27 0.18 0.23 0.15 0.27 0.18 0.22 0.15 
Sample Polity > 8 Polity > 8 Polity > 6 Polity > 6 Polity > 8 Polity > 8 Polity > 6 Polity > 6 
USA included  Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix A: Details on the coding of Complaints  
The variable Complaints measures the cumulative number of disputes filed 
against a country alleging the existence of an illegal narrow transfer in a given year. 
Complaints filed over other issues are systematically identified and excluded. These 
include: (1) complaints over broad transfers and/or policies that affect a wide range of 
goods, producers, or industries, like, for example, the 1982 dispute over the value 
added tax (VAT) threshold; (2) complaints related to the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights; (3) complaints filed against the European Community/European 
Union unless it is very clear which EC/EU member the complaint was filed in 
response to; (4) complaints related to anti-dumping measures because anti-dumping 
measures are imposed in response to a foreign firm’s policy rather than a foreign 
government’s policy; (5) complaints that are explicitly political in nature like, for 
example, the 1985 complaint filed by Nicaragua against the US in response to the 
trade embargo imposed by the Reagan Administration. Complaints over 
countervailing duties are included only after carefully examining the GATT/WTO 
Panel Reports to correctly identify the country initially accused of having an illegal 
narrow transfer. Complaints filed by multiple countries over a single illegal narrow 
transfer are counted only once against the defendant country. Two independent coders 
identified the set of relevant disputes using these coding criteria. The percentage 
agreement between the two coders was approximately 98 percent.  
 
  
 
                                                 
i
 There are, of course, exceptions. For example, agriculture is largely exempt from 
these restrictions.  
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ii
 A debate exists within the literature as to whether parties target swing districts or 
safe districts. See, for example, Cox and McCubbins (1986), Lindbeck and Weibull 
(1987) and Dixit and Londregan (1996). For this paper, the distinction is not critical. 
Both arguments point to the importance of targeting benefits to narrow 
geographically-defined constituencies in majoritarian systems. 
iii
 Changes in the rules of negotiation implemented during the Kennedy Round (1964-
67) may, in fact, be viewed as the first attempt to limit narrowly targeted benefits. 
Under the new rules, linear reductions in tariffs were negotiated rather than item-by-
item reductions. 
iv
 Yet another theory argues that democracies are relatively less likely to provide trade 
protections (e.g. Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff 2000; Milner and Kubota, 2005). 
Although the reasons given for this vary, the expectation is that democratically elected 
leaders have fewer incentives to provide protection than autocratic leaders.  
v
 However, Karol (2007) finds no empirical support in the United States for the claim 
that larger constituencies makes politicians less protectionist.  
vi
 Single member districts also allow voters to assign credit for the provision of 
targeted transfers. In multimember districts, voters do not know which of their 
representatives to credit for providing targeted transfers (Ashworth and Bueno de 
Mesquita, 2006). Voters observe the total amount of transfers provided to the district 
but not the amount produced by individual legislators. This reduces the domestic 
electoral benefits of providing narrowly targeted transfers in multi-member districts. 
As such, politicians in multi-member districts may be unwilling to work to provide 
narrow transfers in violation of GATT/WTO rules because the costs of doing are 
likely to outweigh the benefits. 
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vii
 However, Monroe and Rose (2002) show that districting matters for partisan 
electoral outcomes in PR systems under certain circumstances.  
viii
 Leeds (2003) takes a similar approach by examining instances of non-compliance 
with alliance commitments. 
ix
 Data are from Hudec (1993), Reinhardt (1996), Allee (2009) and the WTO (2005). 
The coding criteria used to identify relevant disputes are detailed in Appendix A. Two 
independent coders coded agreements according to these criteria. The percentage 
agreement between the two coders was 98 percent. 
x
 80 percent during the period from 1980-1994; 66 percent during 1995-2003. 
xi
 However, majoritarian systems tend to be more frequent in large countries. The size 
of a defendant country (or market) may influence plaintiff country’s decisions to file a 
formal complaint. To control for this, I include various measures of the defendant 
countries’ economic size in all estimated models (GDP and GDP per capita). I also 
include measures of a defendant country’s population and area in models run as 
robustness checks. Importantly, electoral rules remain a robust predictor of the 
number of GATT/WTO complaints filed against a given country controlling for 
various measures of country’s size. This minimizes the possibility that the positive 
correlation between majoritarian electoral rules and WTO-inconsistent policies is 
spurious.  
xii
 The mean value of Complaints is 0.17; the standard deviation is 0.55. Although the 
unconditional variance is greater than the unconditional mean, the dispersion 
parameter, alpha, closely approximates zero in several of the estimated models. When 
alpha is equal to zero, the negative binominal distribution is equivalent to a Poisson 
distribution.  
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xiii
 Exports are used to predict zero counts. Countries that export nothing to the global 
market arguably face little scrutiny of their domestic transfers. However, Exports is 
not a robust predictor of the incidence of zeros. Importantly, the estimated coefficients 
for the key variables of interest (Majoritarian and Mean District Magnitude) are very 
similar to those estimated using a negative binominal model; the standard errors are 
relatively lower.  
xiv
 Although dyadic studies have become increasingly common in the GATT/WTO 
literature, several recent papers question this trend. Rose (2008) argues that monadic 
tests may be more appropriate than dyadic tests for understanding the expected effects 
of the GATT/WTO on countries’ trade policy decisions. Similarly, Allee and Scalera 
(2009) make a strong case for using monadic rather than dyadic data to examine the 
effects of GATT/WTO accession on domestic policy. Dai (2006) illustrates the 
potential pitfalls of testing monadic theories using dyadic data.  
xv
 A fully interacted model is also estimated to test for equality of coefficients across 
these two regimes. The estimated coefficients for both Majoritarian and Mean 
District Magnitude are remarkably consistent across the two regimes.  
xvi
 All control variables are lagged one year. Alternative lag structures were tested. 
For example, Plaintiff was lagged for two years rather than just one. However, this did 
not significantly alter the key findings.  
xvii
 Population and area are used as alternative indicators of size. These results are not 
reported here but are available from the author upon request. Importantly, the key 
results are robust to the inclusion of these alternative measures of country size.  
xviii
 Data on all economic variables come from the World Development Indicators 
(World Bank 2005).  
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xix
 The variance inflation factor (VIF) is less than 4 for all variables included in the 
estimated models, as recommended by Huber et al. (1993). 
xx
 These results are consistent with those reported by Davis (2008).  
xxi
 These data come from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al., 2001).  
xxii
 These data come from Johnson and Wallack (2005). Using a measure of mean 
district magnitude taken from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al., 2001) 
produced very similar results.  
xxiii
 Here, the sample includes only those countries with a Polity score greater than 8. 
xxiv
 For countries under the WTO regime that did not file a complaint in the previous 
year. All quantitative control variables are set equal to their median values. 
xxv
 Here, the sample is expanded to include all countries with Polity scores greater 
than 6.  
xxvi
 For example, electoral institutions remain robust predictors of non-compliance 
even when a measure of rule of law is included. Previous research demonstrates that 
countries with strong rule-of-law traditions are more likely to comply with 
international agreements (Simmons 2000).  
xxvii
 Although countries self select into electoral rules, there is little reason to believe 
that this non-random selection biases the reported results. Countries predisposed to 
protection are no more likely to choose majoritarian electoral rules than proportional 
rules (Boix 1999). Instead, a country’s selection of electoral rules depends critically 
on ethnic and/or religious fragmentation (Boix 1999, Rokkan 1970). Although 
fragmentation influences a country’s choice of electoral system, it is unlikely to 
influence the country’s trade policies. Thus, the possibility of a spurious correlation or 
selection bias is minimal. Further evidence of this is provided by empirical tests that 
include an indicator of the historical period during which the country adopted the 
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electoral rules in use at the time of the observation. If there are historical trends in 
electoral institutions, then the period during which a country’s electoral rules were 
chosen is likely correlated with the selection and therefore the conditional-
independence assumption is more credible when this variable is included in the 
estimated model. These results are available from the author upon request. Controlling 
for the age of a country’s electoral institutions, countries with majoritarian electoral 
rules are more likely to be named as defendants in GATT/WTO complaints.  
xxviii
 A notable exception is Allee (2009).  
